One of my favorite things about the Army's Intermediate Level of Education (ILE) is the variety of guest speakers. The course does an admirable job finding speakers to discuss interesting and thought provoking topics. In the spirit of the oft-repeated course mantra of teaching us "how to think, not what to think," speakers are occasionally chosen who disagree with one another. We recently completed a complimentary pair of lectures on the future of the US Army and how to best prepare for the future. The first lecture was from Dr. John Nagl, lately of the Center for A New American Security, and one of the leading proponents and co-authors of the Army's counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine. Changing the Army's approach to COIN is given a lot of credit for the success of the Iraq troop "surge" of 2007. As a counter-point to Dr. Nagl, ILE brought in COL Gian Gentile, chief of American History at West Point.
COL Gentile argues that the Army is doing itself a disservice by focusing on COIN. He believes that the Army has lost some core warfighting competencies which will leave us in a very difficult position during the next major conflict. I have no personal stake in the debate - I am neither a "COINdanista" nor am I enamored with nostalgia for armored columns charging through the Fulda Gap. I was simply interested to hear his talk and to conceptually contrast it with Dr. Nagl. In the end, COL Gentile's presentation left me feeling cold.
My major point of contention is that COL Gentile saw the COIN/not COIN debate in very discrete black and white terms. The underlying assumption to his theory is that the Army plans to train for COIN operations, to the exclusion of all else, losing the ability to conduct high intensity combined arms operations. I need to review Dr. Nagl's talk, but I don't recall him suggesting the Army ignore high intensity conflict training in order to perfect COIN.
I understand that COL Gentile had a limited time with us as an audience to present his ideas, but what he did present was disappointingly underdeveloped. For example, much of the talk was anecdotal, coming from one Brigade Commander who is an acquaintance of his. He used this one brigade to argue that units trained for high intensity conflict were the most adaptable in Iraq, though he did not articulate what metrics he used to define success. This example brigade used 90% of their pre-deployment training time to prepare for 10% of what they did in theater, specifically high intensity conflict. I acknowledge that high intensity conflict is the most dangerous operation with the highest potential for casualties, so time should be dedicated to it. What I question is the lack of preparation for the majority of the unit's mission. How successful were they at the lion's share of their tasks?
Citing the Army's counterinsurgency manual's description of COIN operations as "graduate level,"1 he incredulously asked if the Battle of the Somme in World War I, with 7,000 dead in the first hour, was merely "undergrad," as though casualties alone dictated the difficulty of the operation. I find it hard to believe that the basic WWI tactics of preparatory artillery barrages, going "over the top" of the trenches to fight a frontal assault, die, rinse, and repeat ad naseuem can be accurately described as "graduate" thinking on any level.
COL Gentile also had great consternation with "American COIN," stating that it did not work. Unfortunately for the uninitiated, he never defined what he meant by "American COIN," nor did he suggest that there was a different flavor of COIN which worked better.
Similarly, he mentioned that language and culture training was "an educational issue," which should be trained to the minimum standard. He never explained what he meant by "educational issue," and I was left wondering if he was suggesting that only unit leadership should get a modicum of language and culture training. As an officer whose career is steeped in language and culture, I can attest that these skills take a lifetime to adequately develop. I fear the influence of the "Strategic Corporal" whose "minimum standard" training consists of a graphic training aid with some badly transliterated phrases in the local language and a few cultural no-nos to avoid.
My final thought on COL Gentile's theory is that he never articulated the threat against which the Army needs to have a high intensity conflict capability. I don't discount that there may be a future need for these types of operations, but the current reality is that the Army is conducting COIN. Soldiers on the ground need to be well trained for what they are being asked to do, not more focused on what they may be called on to do.
1. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 1-1.
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