A Visit to the Senate Armed Services Committee

A huge benefit of attending the Army's Intermediate Level Education (ILE) at the Fort Belvoir satellite campus is the proximity to Washington, D.C.  We take advantage of this closeness by occasionally holding class "off-site," visiting various government agencies in the city.  On March 8th, 2012, my class section visited an open hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was hearing testimony from the Honorable John McHugh, the Secretary of the Army, and GEN Ray Odierno, the Chief of Staff of the Army, on the Army's budget authorization request for fiscal year 2013 and the future of the Army - at least, that was the published intent of the hearing.

I found this trip to be utterly fascinating.  I admit that I don't have much interest in politics or the inner workings of government.  Whatever I had learned in middle or high school civics class has long since departed my brain, so this trip was highly educational.  Some of the things which I found interesting:

• Time keeping.  The Senators were allotted seven minutes to question Secretary McHugh and GEN Odierno.  This was not strictly enforced, which was not surprising.  What did intrigue me was the way in which the committee members were notified that their time was coming to a close.  You'd think that they'd have some sort of light system, or a gavel, or a bell of some sort.  Certainly not what they did use: Post-It notes.  Or, what looked to be Post-It notes from where I was sitting.  As each Senator's time came to a close, a staffer from the back walked to them and deposited a yellow square of paper next to both the Senator with the floor and the chairman.  I could only think of the little stack of notes that Senator Levin must have had in front of him by the end of the hearing.
• Lack of Committee cohesiveness.  I would have thought that a full committee hearing would be just that - the full committee hearing testimony.  Nope.  The full committee was there at the opening of the hearing, then they left until it was their turn to ask a question.  With senators and staffers constantly coming in and out of the room, it made for a very distracting environment.  It seemed even more disruptive because the door everyone used was directly behind the chairman.
• Political statements.  I can understand why no one wanted to stick around for the entire hearing, since it had very little to do with the actual stated purpose for the testimony, that is, the Army's budget request and the state of the Army.  Instead, it provided the members of the committee a platform to make statements, push their agendas, and get some sound bites for reelection campaigns.  Senator McCain pushed for a opinion to attack Iran.  Other Senators asked about reserve units or Army equipment programs which impacted their state only (the Air Force's proposal to drop the C-27 was one of the hot topics du jour).

On balance, it was a very worthwhile trip.  Seeing government operate (or, not) first hand really helps to drive home some of the frustration that people feel toward Congress.  I understand the human desire to get reelected, but Senators should have a wider field of view than just their State - that's why we have the House, after all.  Also, seeing a part of Congress in the flesh - the old, aged, barely mobile flesh - just reinforces in my mind the need for term limits.  (I'm looking at you, Senator Inouye.)

For the interested, open hearings are webcast and archived.

The Other Side of the COIN

One of my favorite things about the Army's Intermediate Level of Education (ILE) is the variety of guest speakers.  The course does an admirable job finding speakers to discuss interesting and thought provoking topics.  In the spirit of the oft-repeated course mantra of teaching us "how to think, not what to think," speakers are occasionally chosen who disagree with one another.  We recently completed a complimentary pair of lectures on the future of the US Army and how to best prepare for the future.  The first lecture was from Dr. John Nagl, lately of the Center for A New American Security, and one of the leading proponents and co-authors of the Army's counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine.  Changing the Army's approach to COIN is given a lot of credit for the success of the Iraq troop "surge" of 2007.  As a counter-point to Dr. Nagl, ILE brought in COL Gian Gentile, chief of American History at West Point.

COL Gentile argues that the Army is doing itself a disservice by focusing on COIN.  He believes that the Army has lost some core warfighting competencies which will leave us in a very difficult position during the next major conflict.  I have no personal stake in the debate - I am neither a "COINdanista" nor am I enamored with nostalgia for armored columns charging through the Fulda Gap.  I was simply interested to hear his talk and to conceptually contrast it with Dr. Nagl.  In the end, COL Gentile's presentation left me feeling cold.

My major point of contention is that COL Gentile saw the COIN/not COIN debate in very discrete black and white terms.  The underlying assumption to his theory is that the Army plans to train for COIN operations, to the exclusion of all else, losing the ability to conduct high intensity combined arms operations.  I need to review Dr. Nagl's talk, but I don't recall him suggesting the Army ignore high intensity conflict training in order to perfect COIN.

I understand that COL Gentile had a limited time with us as an audience to present his ideas, but what he did present was disappointingly underdeveloped.  For example, much of the talk was anecdotal, coming from one Brigade Commander who is an acquaintance of his.  He used this one brigade to argue that units trained for high intensity conflict were the most adaptable in Iraq, though he did not articulate what metrics he used to define success.  This example brigade used 90% of their pre-deployment training time to prepare for 10% of what they did in theater, specifically high intensity conflict.  I acknowledge that high intensity conflict is the most dangerous operation with the highest potential for casualties, so time should be dedicated to it.  What I question is the lack of preparation for the majority of the unit's mission.  How successful were they at the lion's share of their tasks?

Citing the Army's counterinsurgency manual's description of COIN operations as "graduate level,"¹ he incredulously asked if the Battle of the Somme in World War I, with 7,000 dead in the first hour, was merely "undergrad," as though casualties alone dictated the difficulty of the operation.  I find it hard to believe that the basic WWI tactics of preparatory artillery barrages, going "over the top" of the trenches to fight a frontal assault, die, rinse, and repeat ad naseuem can be accurately described as "graduate" thinking on any level.

COL Gentile also had great consternation with "American COIN," stating that it did not work.  Unfortunately for the uninitiated, he never defined what he meant by "American COIN," nor did he suggest that there was a different flavor of COIN which worked better.

Similarly, he mentioned that language and culture training was "an educational issue," which should be trained to the minimum standard.  He never explained what he meant by "educational issue," and I was left wondering if he was suggesting that only unit leadership should get a modicum of language and culture training.  As an officer whose career is steeped in language and culture, I can attest that these skills take a lifetime to adequately develop.  I fear the influence of the "Strategic Corporal" whose "minimum standard" training consists of a graphic training aid with some badly transliterated phrases in the local language and a few cultural no-nos to avoid. 

My final thought on COL Gentile's theory is that he never articulated the threat against which the Army needs to have a high intensity conflict capability.  I don't discount that there may be a future need for these types of operations, but the current reality is that the Army is conducting COIN.  Soldiers on the ground need to be well trained for what they are being asked to do, not more focused on what they may be called on to do.

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1. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 1-1.

Academic Arabic

Time enables you to have a better perspective on the past.  Having completed my graduate studies at The University of Virginia, I can reflect upon and better appreciate the Arabic instruction that I received at the Defense Language Institute.

The program at DLI, for all of its faults and frustrations, did teach me Arabic, and to a very high level.  Looking back, I marvel at the amount of Arabic that I knew and the ease with which I could use it.  I was able to be conversant on a variety of topics, comprehend television news broadcasts, and was on the cusp of understanding interviews.  Though not an 'immersive' environment, the intensity of DLI kept my language in top shape.

Studying Arabic at a civilian university presented a host of new challenges.  Time away from DLI atrophied my ability.  Good intentions aside, I found it impossible to replicate the daily pressure to improve my language.  It was a humbling experience and it forced me to make a mental recalculation of my Arabic ability.  I also found that, in an academic setting, there is much more emphasis on understanding grammar.  Gone was the simple military objective of 'comprehension'.  I was being asked to know grammatical terms and understand voweling for the different grammatical cases.  This caused me much frustration and a realization that in order to reach that level linguistically, I need to put in a lot of time studying on my own.

My course at DLI may not have had much focus on grammar, but it did give me a solid foundation in Arabic.  I'm confident that if I apply myself, a fuller understanding of Arabic is within reach.

Sharing Our Story with the Nation

The US Army's Command and General Staff School has directed that officers enrolled in the Intermediate Level of Education conduct community outreach activities in order to engage the American public and 'tell our story' as members of the Army.  I've been pretty infrequent with my blogging, so I see this as a perfect opportunity to resurrect the blog, get some regular writing practice, and archive some stories as a 'rough draft' for memoirs some day in the distant future.

Over the next few months you can expect to see stories and experiences from my time in the Army and possibly some opinion on current events.  Hopefully non-military folks find these stories interesting and that they shed some light on life in the Army.  Of course, these are all anecdotal and from a single career experience, so take that for what it's worth...your Army mileage may vary.